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THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT: EXPANDING THE
BOYCOTT EXCEPTION
The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act,' adopted by Con-
gress in 1945, declares that continued regulation and taxation of the insur-
ance industry by the states is in the public interest.2 Pursuant to this
policy, the Act exempts the business of insurance3 from the federal anti-
trust statutes to the extent that state law regulates the industry., Section
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13 (1970).
2 Id. § 1011. Section 1 of the Act provides:
Congress hereby declares that continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States.
Id. § 1012. Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That [the Sherman, Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts] shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
The reach of the exemption has been narrowed slightly by litigation focusing on the meaning
of "business of insurance" and the extent of state regulation comprehended by the Act. The
Supreme Court has construed the term "business of insurance" to include only activities
affecting the relationship between the insurance company and its policyholders or the status
of the company as a reliable insurer. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The
Court cited rate-fixing activities, selling and advertising of policies, and licensing of compa-
nies and their agents as examples of the business of insurance. Id. at 460. Subsequent deci-
sions applying the National Securities standard have found that the business of insurance
encompasses contracts between health insurers and hospitals setting fees for medical services,
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); and "tying" arrangements, Addrisi v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y., 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Commander
Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973). But cf. Fry v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tax. 1973) ("incidental" sale of insur-
ance tied to a non-insurance transaction, a farm loan, does not constitute business of insur-
ance).
Activities of insurance companies held to be outside the business of insurance include
stock acquisitions and mergers, SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), tactics aimed
at other insurance companies such as stealing trade secrets and customer lists, and "twisting"
policyholders. Twisting is an attempt by one insurance company to convince the policyhold-
ers of another company to terminate their policies and reinsure with the former. American
Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned Marketing Assoc., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va.
1974). See generally Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption for "The Business
of Insurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Business of Insurance].
Enactment of a state regulatory scheme that authorizes or permits certain standards
of conduct in the insurance industry is sufficient regulation to invoke the exemption. Ohio
AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917
(1972). Courts faced with seemingly ineffective insurance regulation or general trade regula-
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3(b) of the Act, however, provides an exception to this exemption by ex-
cluding from the statute's protective shield acts and agreements amount-
ing to boycott, intimidation or coercion. 5 Recently, a conflict has developed
among the federal circuit courts in defining the range of anticompetitive
activities encompassed by the boycott exception and the class of plaintiffs
entitled to sue under the exception.'
Traditionally, the courts have viewed the boycott exception as designed
solely to protect insurance companies and their agents from "blacklisting"7
tactics engaged in by other insurance companies or agents.' This approach
prevents policyholders and non-insurance businesses from suing insurance
companies under the boycott exception. Within the past year, however,
two circuits have rejected this narrow construction by expanding the scope
of the boycott exception.'" The First Circuit, in Barry v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.," broadly construed the boycott exception to permit
an action for injunctive relief and treble damages against insurance com-
panies that concertedly refused to deal with policyholders."2 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Proctor v. State Farm
tions consistently have found state "regulation" sufficient for the purposes of the Act. See,
e.g., FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (legislative enactment proscribing
unfair insurance advertising and authorizing enforcement found sufficient); Crawford v.
American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975) (statute prohibiting unfair methods of
competition in insurance satisfies the Act); Lawyers Title Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp.,
526 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975) (state statute requiring reasonable insurance rates is sufficient
regulation of pricing practices). See generally Comment, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A
Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. Rxv. 1271, 1283-85, 1285 n.85 (1976). For a
discussion critical of the low standard for testing the adequacy of state regulation, see Craw-
ford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion); Comment,
State Regulation Under the McCarran Act, 47 TuL. L. REV. 1069 (1973).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970). The boycott exception provides: "Nothing contained in this
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce
of intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
I Id. Compare Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975) and Addrisi
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1975) (only insurance companies
and insurance agents have standing) with Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d
3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No. 77-240) (policyholders have
standing); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (auto
repair shops have standing); and Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (chiropractors denied insurance reimbursement for their services
have standing).
7 See text accompanying notes 32-36 infra.
I Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261
F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
Hospitals, chiropractors, auto repair shops, funeral homes and other businesses that
provide insurable services have brought antitrust claims against insurance companies. See,
e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (auto repair
shops).
,0 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977); Proctor v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No. 77-240).
I2 Id. at 12; see text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'" held that a concerted refusal to deal
with repair shops which were unwilling to comply with a schedule of repair
cost estimates fixed by insurance companies was actionable under the
boycott exception.'4 These two decisions significantly expand the boycott
exception by permitting policyholders and businesses to seek relief under
the Sherman Act 5 against insurance companies engaged in activities that
have an anticompetitive effect outside the insurance industry. Neverthe-
less, judicial expansion of the class of persons entitled to sue under the
boycott exception raises the troublesome possibility that legitimate, state
authorized rate-fixing activities'" by private insurance companies will be
exposed to federal antitrust laws contrary to the purpose of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exemption."
Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association (S.E. U.A.)"8 which held that the sale of insurance was inter-
state commerce subject to federal regulation.'" Specifically, the Court
found that the defendant rate-making combination,"0 S.E.U.A., had vio-
13 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11 Id. at 275. The court affirmed, however, the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant insurance companies for lack of a record establishing evidence
of a group boycott. Id. at 276.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
,8 Typically, joint rate-making (cooperative setting of premium rates), pooled loss experi-
ence (shared statistical information), shared underwriting of large risks and standardization
of contract forms are cooperative activities supervised by state insurance commissioners as a
means of establishing financial responsibility. See generally R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCI-
PLES OF INSURANCE 751-68 (4th Cir. 1966). Premium rates and rate classifications for fire,
workmen's compensation and automobile liability insurance formulated by member compa-
nies of a rating bureau are subject to approval by the state commissioner of insurance. The
commissioner usually serves as chairman or as an ex officio member of the bureau. See
generally The Business of Insurance, supra note 3, at 335-36. For a discussion of the history
of concerted rate-making, see Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REv. 545
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Kimball & Boyce].
'7 See text accompanying notes 64-79 infra.
, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
, Id. at 539-40. For seventy-five years prior to the S.E. U.A. decision, insurance contracts
were deemed to be intrastate transactions outside the purview of federal legislation regulating
interstate commerce. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). In S.E.U.A., the
Court held that exclusion of insurance from the scope of interstate commerce was inconsistent
with other decisions broadly interpreting the commerce clause, 322 U.S. at 549-53. See, e.g.,
Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 425 (1926) (diseased cattle ranging between Georgia
and Florida are in commerce); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-39 (1925) (stolen
auto driven from Iowa to South Dakota is in commerce); United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S.
465, 467 (1920) (whiskey carried across state line for personal consumption is commerce);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308,320-23 (1913) (transportation of a woman from Louisiana
to Texas in a common carrier is interstate commerce).
1 The private rate-making combination in S.E.U.A. consisted of approximately 200
private stock fire insurance companies which controlled ninety percent of the fire insurance
business in six states. 322 U.S. at 534-55. The indictment against S.E.U.A. charged that
Association members violated both sections of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970), by
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lated the Sherman Act. The uncertain legal status of existing state regula-
tion and taxation of insurance which resulted from the S.E. U.A. decision
created considerable administrative confusion.2' Under pressure from the
states and the insurance industry, 2 Congress quickly enacted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act narrowing the impact of federal laws on the insur-
ance industry.2 3 Although Congress intended to remove the spector of fed-
eral regulation raised in S.E. U.A. by insulating state regulation that other-
wise might violate antitrust laws, 2 the exemption was not absolute. Sec-
tion 3(b) was enacted to prevent a recurrence of anticompetitive practices
characterized by the S.E.U.A. Court as "boycotts", "coercion" and
"intimidation". 2 Since these terms are not defined in the statute, courts
conspiring to fix and maintain noncompetitive premium rates on fire and casualty insurance
in restraint of trade and commerce, and by conspiring to monopolize those same lines of
insurance. 322 U.S. 534-35.
2, The majority opinion in S.E.U.A. overruled Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1868), to the extent that state regulatory and taxation statutes interfered with interstate
commerce. 322 U.S. at 548; see note 19 supra. The S.E.U.A. Court recognized that where
particular phases of an interstate business have long been regulated by the states, state
regulatory and taxation laws should not be declared invalid in the absence of conflicting
congressional action. Id. at 548-49. Despite the Court's intention to leave intact the line of
decisions upholding state insurance laws and attack certain insurance practices, see note 28
infra, the decision in S.E.U.A. was widely interpreted as undercutting state control of the
insurance industry. See, e.g., E. SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERcE 50-57 (1945);
91 CONG. REc. 1087, 1142-45 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Celler & Sen. McCarran); Comment,
Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, tte Boycott Excep-
tion, and the Public Interest, 27 RuT.-CAm. L. REv. 140, 142-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Interest]. States were uncertain
whether existing regulatory schemes unduly burdened interstate commerce and were there-
fore unenforceable. The refusal of insurance companies to pay state taxes threatened a huge
loss of revenue due to uncertainty of states' collection authority. See Kimball & Boyce, supra
note 16, at 554 nn.42 & 45. The industry joined the states' clamor for enactment of legislation
not only to protect rate-making bureaus, but to clarify the liability of insurance companies
that withheld payment of state taxes. See 91 CONG. REc. 478-79 (1945) (remarks of Sen.
Ferguson). The states and the insurance industry favored passage of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act because of a fear that increased competition would dangerously reduce loss reserves, that
is, assets held for the settlement of claims. The industry asserted that companies made
financially unstable by rate-cutting would threaten the public interest by increasing the
possibility of insolvency in the face of large claims. See 91 CONG. REc. 1092 (1945). For a
detailed review of state and industry reaction to the S.E. UA. decision, see Note, A Year of
S.E.UA., 23 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 317 (1945).
,2 See note 21 supra.
1 Even while the S. E. U.A. decision was pending, there were unsuccessful attempts to
exempt the insurance industry from all federal regulation. See S. 1362; H.R. 3270, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943). In the next session, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed as a compromise
between the House bill, advocating complete exemption from the antitrust laws, and the
Senate version, supporting federal oversight of the insurance industry. See Kimball & Boyce,
supra note 16, at 555.
214 In a decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court stated,
"obviously Congress' purpose was to broadly give support to existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the business of insurance." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
11 322 U.S. at 335-36; see 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970). The Senate report accompanying
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have looked to the practices condemned in S.E. U.A. and to the legislative
history" of the Act to define the proper scope of the boycott exception.
In S.E. U.A., the Court upheld an indictment charging members of the
Association with conspiring to fix premium rates at noncompetitive levels
and to monopolize the insurance business in violation of the Sherman
Act.Y The indictment further alleged that rating and inspection bureaus,
to which Association members belonged, maintained the conspiracies by
using destructive business practices,2 including blacklistimg, 2 to force
nonmember companies to join the conspiracies and to compel consumers
to purchase only from Association members at fixed rates. The Court found
that the "boycotts together with other types of coercion and intimida-
tion"30 used to enforce the conspiracies were exactly the type of conduct
prohibited by the Sherman Act.
During the legislative debates preceding passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the term "blacklisting" was used twice to refer to practices
involving boycotts, coercion or intimidation directed at insurance compa-
nies.3 2 The legislative history, however, is silent on whether the scope of
the boycott exception should be restricted to instances of blacklisting.
Nonetheless, the first articulation of the narrow construction of section
3(b) expressed in Transnational Insurance Co. v. Rosenlund33 relies pri-
the Senate bill stated that with respect to § 3(b), "[the] provisions of the Sherman Act
remain in full force and effect." H. R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., lst sess. (1945), reprinted in
[1945] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 670, 672.
" See 91 CONG. REc. 478-79, 1080-87, 1092, 1142-45 (1945).
21 See note 20 supra.
2' The anticompetitive practices alleged in S.E.U.A. were directed at three different
groups: 1) insurance companies which refused to join the Association were denied an oppor-
tunity to reinsure risks with member companies, a method of spreading a large risk among
several companies; 2) independent agents who represented non-Association companies were
"punished" by a withdrawal of the right to represent Association members; and 3) individual
consumers of insurance who purchased policies from non-Association companies were threat-
ened with boycotts and withdrawal of patronage. 322 U.S. at 535-36.
2 See note 34 infra.
322 U.S. at 535.
Id. at 536.
Congressman Celler stressed the importance of preventing insurance companies and
agents from blacklisting other insurance companies and agents. The thrust of his speech
urged that the boycott exception be drafted to cover "agreements" as well as "acts" of
boycott, coercion or intimidation. 91 CONG. REc. 1087 (1945). The remarks of the Senate floor
manager in particular show a concern for protecting persons or businesses engaged in the
insurance business. Senator O'Mahoney stated that the boycott exception would cover:
.. .any attempt by a small group of insurance companies to enter into an agree-
ment by which they would penalize any person or any business which was attempt-
ing to do business in the insurance field in a way that was disapproved by them,
would be absolutely prohibited by this provision...
The Insurance Executive Association involved in South-Eastern Underwriters un-
dertook by regulation to coerce, intimidate, and boycott its own members and
compel them to obey the rules and regulations the association itself prescribed.
91 CONG. REc. 1480, 1486 (1945) (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney) (emphasis added).
* 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
1978]
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marily on a review of the legislative history. 4 The Transnational court
concluded with little discussion that Congress placed the boycott excep-
tion in the McCarran-Ferguson Act to protect insurance companies from
blacklisting tactics35 condemned in S.E.U.A. Each subsequent decision
which has construed the boycott exception narrowly has relied upon the
examination of the legislative history found in Transnational without fur-
ther elaboration.36
The First Circuit in Barry7 and the District of Columbia Circuit in
Proctor"5 sharply criticized the limited analysis of the legislative history
applied by these courts. Although the S.E.U.A. decision unquestionably
motivated passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 39 nothing contained in
the legislative history would restrict application of the boycott exception
only to the anticompetitive practices alleged in S.E. U.A. Even assuming
Congress intended the boycott exception to reach no further than the prac-
tices condemned in S.E.U.A., the facts in that decision reveal not only
blacklisting of insurance companies and agents, but also threats and boy-
cotts directed at policyholders who purchased insurance from nonmember
m The remarks by Congressman Celler, see note 32 supra, are the only legislative history
cited by the court in Transnational. The court stated:
The legislative history shows that the boycott, coercion and intimidation exception,
was placed in the legislation to protect insurance agents from the issuance by
insurance companies of a "black-list," which would name companies or agents
which were beyond the pale. This list, in effect, was a directive to an agent not to
write insurance in the name of or for the black-listed company, otherwise, he would
be stripped of his agency and not permitted to write insurance for any of the
members of the governing organization of insurance companies.
261 F. Supp. at 26-27 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 27.
3, In Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974), policyholders
alleged that defendant insurance companies agreed to an auto liability rate classification
scheme that constituted a collective refusal to deal except on certain terms. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, stating that "the legislative history
indicates that the boycott exception was designed to reach insurance company 'black-lists'
rather than a refusal to sell to a particular segment of the public at other than a specified
price." 506 F.2d at 734. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint
alleging a coercive tie-in arrangment which forced consumers to purchase expensive life
insurance as additional security for homeowner loans. Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974). The Addrisi court stated that the legislative history
revealed a congressional intention to reach only the narrow area of boycott or coercion among
insurance companies and agents. Id. at 728-29. In both Meicler and Addrisi, Transnational
was cited without elaboration as the examination of the legislative history of § 3(b). Accord,
Pierucci v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (citing Meicler and
Addrisi); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977); Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F.
Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co., No. C70-1620, 1974-2 TRADE
CAS. (CCH) 75,322 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1974).
555 F.2d at 11-12.
561 F.2d at 273.
3' See note 21 supra.
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companies." Both the Barry and Proctor opinions expressed doubt that
Congress intended to exclude from the scope of the boycott exception those
activities specifically described as boycott, coercion or intimidation by the
Supreme Court in S.E. U.A. 41 Moreover, the First and District of Columbia
Circuits found support for rejection of the narrow construction of the boy-
cott exception in the legislative debates. The Barry and Proctor courts
noted that although Congress was concerned primarily with prohibiting
blacklisting of companies and their agents, 2 sponsors of the Senate version
of the Act explained in broad terms that the boycott exception would not
sanction any acts or agreements in restraint of trade or monopolization
that involved boycott, coercion or intimidation." The First and District of
Columbia Circuits concluded, therefore, that despite the absence of any
discussion of boycotts aimed at policyholders or other affected parties, the
legislative history discloses no congressional intent to limit the scope of the
boycott exception to blacklisting tactics used against insurance companies
and their agents.44
Since the statutory language and the legislative history of section 3(b)
provide little guidance in defining the class of persons entitled to sue under
the boycott exception, the First and District of Columbia Circuits rejected
the narrow construction of the boycott exception on the grounds that such
a construction was inconsistent with the ordinary definition of boycott."5
Although neither court offered a clear definition of the term, both courts
The Supreme Court in S.E. U.A. found that "persons needing insurance who purchased
from non-S.E.U.A. companies were threatened with boycott and withdrawal of all patron-
age." 322 U.S. at 536.
11 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 11; Proctor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d at 273-74.
12 See note 32 supra.
4 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 11; Proctor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d at 273. The principal controversy in the Senate debates centered on
Senator Pepper's fear that the Act would not prevent state authorized rating bureaus from
engaging in anticompetitive activities. 91 CoNG. Rzc. 1484 (1945). Senator O'Mahoney re-
sponded that the vice in the insurance industry was not the existence of rating bureaus per
se, but the system of private combinations of insurance companies whose agreements and
understandings invaded the field of congressional regulation of commerce. Id. at 1485. Sena-
tor O'Mahoney stated that although the Act approved of state regulation, including author-
ized rating bureaus, regulation by private groups could not be sanctioned: "My judgment is
that every effective combination or agreement to carry out a program against the public
interest of which I have had any knowledge in this whole insurance study would be prohibited
by the [boycott] section. . ." Id. at 1486 (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney). This language could
not be more unrestricted. 555 F.2d at 12.
" Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 11; Proctor v. State Farm Mut:
Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d at 273. The Barry court rejected the argument of the defendant
insurance companies that a clear intention to restrict the scope of the boycott exception could
be distilled from Congressman Celler's remarks about the danger of blacklisting small compa-
nies, see note 32 supra, and Senator O'Mahoney's remarks about the need to prohibit private
enforcement of rules and regulations by insurance company combinations, see note 28 supra.
555 F.2d at 11.
11 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 7-8; Proctor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d at 272.
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recognized that the meaning of boycott for the purpose of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act must be found in the context of practices condemned by the
Sherman Act. 41 Nevertheless, neither court attempted to define the scope
of anticompetitive acts or agreements which constitute actionable boycotts
under section 3(b).
The "classic" group boycott is an exclusionary practice by traders at
one level who attempt to impede entry at that level by depriving a compet-
itor of either resources or customers.4 7 Such a boycott is condemned as a
per se violation of the Sherman Act; that is, the boycott is conclusively
presumed to be an unreasonable restraint of trade because of the obvious
and necessary effect on competition." Clearly, a concerted refusal by a
11 Id.; accord, Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1977); Monarch Life
Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 952 (1964); Professional Adjusting Sys., Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64
F.R.D. 35, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Cooperativa De Seguros Multiples v. San Juan, 294 F. Supp.
627, 629 (D.P.R. 1968). In Ballard, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
of a complaint by chiropractors alleging that the defendant insurance companies conspired
to refuse insurance coverage for chiropractic services although claims for indentical services
rendered by physicians were honored. The court held that the complaint properly alleged a
boycott under the Sherman Act, thereby stating a claim under the boycott exception of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Fourth Circuit decision did not discuss, however, any § 3(b)
cases or explicitly repudiate the narrow interpretation of the boycott exception. See 543 F.2d
at 1078. But see Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 509, 513-14, aff'd, 506 F.2d
732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y., 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974).
In Meicler, the court held that the mandatory reclassification of policyholders by insurance
companies into a higher premium group did not constitute boycott or coercion. The court
admitted, however, that "the terms boycott and coercion, as commonly defined, might be
construed to encompass the type of activity attributed to defendants. . . ." 372 F. Supp. at
513 (emphasis added). But cf. Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 n.14
(E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd, 554 F.2d 1253 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3218 (Oct. 4, 1977)
(No. 77-171) (accepting the Meicler interpretation with the reservation that the language of
the boycott exception could reach anticompetitive practices other than blacklisting that are
"equally pernicious in violating the most fundamental notions of competition and fair play").
17 See L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRUST § 83 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN].
See id. at §§ 84-85. Group boycotts that are susceptible to the rule of per se illegality
can be divided roughly into three categories: 1) horizontal combinations among traders at one
level of distribution whose purpose is to exclude direct competitors from the market, e.g.,
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914); 2) vertical combinations among traders at different levels designed to exclude direct
competitors of some member of the combination, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959); and 3) combinations designed to influence coercively the trade practices of boycot-
ted victims, rather than eliminate them as competitors, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941). E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d
178, 186-87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). In each of these cases, the touchstone
of per se illegality has been exclusionary or coercive conduct manifesting an anticompetitive
purpose and effect. Id. at 187. A per se rule banning all classic boycotts seems warranted,
since these boycotts always threaten injury to competition and seldom promise any redeeming
benefit. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at § 85. See generally Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in
Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964); Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the




group of insurance companies to deal with potential or actual competitors
for the purpose of inhibiting entry into the market would fit this definition
of boycott. 9 Not all concerted refusals to deal, however, are aimed at
preventing competitive entry at the level of the members of a combina-
tion." The term "boycott" conceptually encompasses a wide variety of acts
and agreements that may or may not violate the Sherman Act.5 Failure
to distingish between classic- commercial boycotts and other boycotts
which lack an anticompetitive purpose or a substantial anticompetitive
effect creates confusion in fixing the limits of Sherman Act liability.
52
Consumer boycotts, "buy American" boycotts, and boycotts with legiti-
mate business purposes should be analyzed differently from classic boy-
cotts in determining Sherman Act violations. Application of the term
"boycott" and a rule of per se illegality to any concerted refusal to deal
without observing the above distinction would jeopardize reasonable con-
certed activity that does no substantial harm to competition. 5 When faced
with a concerted refusal to deal that cannot be characterized as a classic
boycott in restraint of trade, courts should apply the rule of reason analy-
" Combinations of insurance companies that restrict competition by controlling the
opportunities of participating insurance companies to deal with other companies have been
prosecuted successfully for boycott activities. In United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch.,
148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957), the court found that the
Exchange members maintained a group boycott of nonmember insurance agents and compa-
nies who did not sell insurance excluively through the Exchange. The boycott effectively
excluded mutual insurance companies, owned by policyholders, from a substantial part of
the insurance market. The court found the defendant's conduct closely analogous to the facts
in Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), which held that a group boycott
whose object is destruction of competition, enforced by coercion, constitutes a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956),
the court held that the Board's rules restricting the opportunity of mutual companies to sell
fire insurance in all segments of the market restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
"' See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS § 371 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA];
SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at § 90; Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws,
103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 876-77 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Barber].
"' See SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at § 90.
52 Id.
0 Id. Because there is no logical or legal distinction between a refusal to sell at all and a
refusal to sell except on condition, the term "boycott" conceivably could be applied to any
agreement in which the collaborators agree to buy and sell on specific terms. AREEDA, supra
note 50, at § 371. Several courts have distinguished between a classic boycott and a concerted
refusal to deal whose purpose is to exact more favorable trading terms or conditions. In Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), the Ninth Circuit held that the lack of an anticompetitive
motive precluded application of the per se rule to the concerted exclusion of a distributor by
distillers who transferred their lines to a new distributor. The exclusion was merely the
"incidental result" of a legitimate agreement to obtain a more satisfactory distribution. Id.
at 80. Concerted activity having a primary and direct purpose of accomplishing a legitimate
business objective may have only an indirect adverse effect upon the business of third parties
and may be found lawful when judged by the rule of reason. Compare Helix Milling Co. v.
Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976),
with United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub
nom., Western Int'l Hotels Corp. v. United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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sis. "4 Under this analysis, the court may examine the motives of the collab-
orators, the market power of the combination, the economic impact of the
activity on the market, and the effect of the activity on competition.55 The
ultimate issue decided by the rule of reason analysis, usually involving a
detailed factual inquiry, is whether the alleged boycott unreasonably ex-
cludes third parties from participation in the market and therefore unrea-
sonably restrains trade. 6
The boycott alleged in Barry should have been analyzed under the rule
of reason standard. The Barry court held that a refusal by insurance com-
panies to deal with policyholders is no less a violation of the Sherman Act
because the boycott is aimed at consumers rather than competitors. 5 The
plaintiffs in Barry sought to represent all licensed physicians practicing in
Rhode Island and all citizens of the state in need of medical care. 8 Plain-
tiffs alleged that the insurance companies concertedly refused to sell mal-
practice policies to doctors who where dissatisfied with changes in coverage
of existing policies." The First Circuit noted that a boycott of consumers
has the same undesirable effect on the flow of commerce as a boycott
directed at retailers."0 Yet, the boycott alleged in Barry clearly is not a
5' See SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at § 90. Although Professor Sullivan would prefer to
restrict the application of boycott law to concerted refusals that barricade entry, he impliedly
recommends the rule of reason approach to nonclassic boycotts.
If the per se rule respecting boycotts is to become coherent, we must recognize that
it applies only where competitors engage together to inhibit others with whom they
compete by depriving those others of elements needed in the competitive context.
This is not to say that other concerted refusals may not be illegal; many will be,
some of them plainly so. It is only to insist that we look at the others, each for what
it is, and do not suppose that as some distant relative of the classic boycott it must
be cursed with the same baleful characteristics.
Id. at 259.
Id. at §§ 68-72.
56 Id. at § 68; Barber, supra note 50, at 877. But see Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal
Under Antitrust Laws, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1531, 1536 (1958) (criticizing Barber).
5 555 F.2d at 7-8 n.4.
Id. at 5.
Id. According to the complaint, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company changed
its future malpractice coverage from an "occurrence" basis, providing liability protection for
any act done while the policy is in effect, to a "claims made" basis, protecting against claims
made during the life of the policy. Plaintiffs alleged also that the other insurance companies
refused to sell them any malpractice policies. Id.
,o In a footnote discussion, the Barry court reasoned that a boycott aimed at consumers
may restrain the ability of traders to sell in accordance with their own judgment as well as
deprive consumers of the freedom to buy in an open, competitive market. Id. at 7-8, n.4. The
court found support for this proposition in the Supreme Court's decision in Klor's v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a classic boycott situation. See note 48
supra. Broadway-Hale, a large appliance dealer, exercised its vast purchasing power to induce
manufacturers and wholesalers to deal with Kor's only at discriminatory prices. The purpose
and effect of the Broadway-Hale boycott was to eliminate the plaintiff as a competitor in
retail appliances. The Supreme Court condemned the combination as a group boycott which
was illegal per se. 359 U.S. at 212-13.
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classic boycott 6' and therefore requires analysis under the rule of reason to
determine whether the restrictive activity unreasonably restrains trade.1
2
Unfortunately, the court formulated no guidelines for analyzing the eco-
nomic effect of a concerted refusal to deal with policyholders. Thus far, no
court has analyzed the meaning of boycott, coercion and intimidation
directed at policyholders or non-insurance businesses. 3
1, The boycott alleged in Barry was not directed at competitors at any level. See note 48
supra.
62 See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra. In deciding only whether plaintiffs had
standing to sue, the First Circuit did not undertake a rule of reason analysis. The question
remains whether the inquiry should focus on the economic impact of the boycott on the
competitiveness of the insurance market in Rhode Island or on the competitiveness of the
practice of medicine, or both. Given that the Sherman Act primarily protects competition,
not individual competitors, courts could reasonably require that, under an expanded reading
of the boycott exception, policyholders must demonstrate a restrictive effect on competition
in their industry or business. See, e.g., Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1077 (4th Cir.
1976) (chiropractors alleged that the purpose ind effect of denial of coverage by insurance
companies was to eliminate the competition of chiropractors throughout the state). Even
under an expanded reading of the boycott exception, plaintiffs must satisfy the standing
requirements of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), which authorizes a private suit
for damages as a consequence of an antitrust violation. Only persons who have been injured
in "his business or property" may sue under the antitrust laws. Id. Several courts have
experimented with different tests for determining whether an alleged injury to business or
property is sufficiently direct to be remedied by a treble damage action. The "target area"
test has emerged as the preferred test: A plaintiff must show that "he is within the sector of
the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular
industry" and that he was proximately injured by the antitrust violation. Jeffrey v. South-
western Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1975); see Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 493 F.2d 39, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); South Carolina
Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
62 Compare Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1964) and
Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers. Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont.
1958). In Proctor, plaintiff auto repair shops alleged a group boycott by insurance companies.
Although the court rejected the narrow construction of the boycott exception, it did not accept
the proposition that § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act encompasses all acts and agree-
ments of boycott, coercion or intimidation prohibited by the Sherman Act. 561 F.2d at 274;
see text accompanying notes 80-86 infra. Where insurance companies have alleged boycott,
courts have been more expansive in fixing the limits of the boycott exception. In Professional
& Business Men's Life, the court rejected defendants' argument that the definition of boycott
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act is limited to a concerted refusal to deal. Quoting Para-
mount Enterprises v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328, 330 (1932), the court stated:
In its more modem significance, the term "boycott" connotes a variety of action,
ranging from a mere withdrawal of business by an individual to an organized effort
by associated individuals to procure all others to withdraw from such intercourse.
It is accomplished by means ranging from simple persuasion to the disturbance of
business relations with third persons and the person boycotted by physical intimi-
dation or violence.
163 F. Supp. at 281. The court in Professional & Business Men's Life concluded that § 3(b)
applies to all boycotts which are intended to restrain commerce among the states in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 283. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Monarch Life Ins. Co.
interpreted the boycott exception to include "all boycotts or agreements to boycott con-
demned by the Sherman Act." 326 F.2d at 846.
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Precisely because the meaning of the terms "boycott, coercion and
intimidation" is unsettled, courts have adopted the narrow construction of
the boycott exception as a bright-line test. Courts adopting the narrow
construction have feared that a reading of these terms consistent with their
ordinary meaning would impair substantially the exemption of state regu-
lation of insurance from federal antitrust laws contained in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. 4 This "vitiation" argument proceeds from the premise that
the term boycott makes no distinction between an absolute refusal to deal
and a refusal to deal except at a fixed price."5 If this distinction does not
exist, then concerted rate-fixing by insurance companies conceivably could
be attacked under the boycott exception. The Proctor court admitted that
a simple agreement among insurance companies establishing a premium
rate structure could be characterized as a boycott because the participants
refuse to deal except at the agreed price."6 If the plain meaning of the
boycott exception in the context of the Sherman Act encompasses rate-
fixing activities, then section 3(b) would appear to introduce a substantial
portion of federal antitrust regulation into the insurance industry. 7 Ac-
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970); see, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d
732 (5th Cir. 1975) (expansion would "emasculate" antitrust exemption); Addrisi v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974) (expansion would "vitiate" the exemp-
tion); Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458, 462 (W.D. Pa. 1977) ("federal
invasion").
" See California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 F.
Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959). In California League, the court stated, "There is no reason to hold
that § 3(b) withholds immunity in case of an actual total boycott, but grants antitrust
immunity for a threatened total or partial boycott." Id. at 66; see AREEDA, supra note 50, at
§ 371.
" 561 F.2d at 274.
The dissenting opinion in Barry stressed that Congress' intention to leave the regula-
tion of insurance rates to the states, free from interference from federal antitrust laws, is the
central thread running through the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 555 F.2d at 15 (Campbell, J.,
dissenting). The business of insurance certainly covers rate-fixing activities and the business
of insurance is subject to state regulation. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Judge Campbell criticized the majority in Barry for expanding the boycott exception beyond
the narrow construction without explaining why "Congress should first take pains to elimi-
nate the antitrust laws and then reintroduce by the back door most of the Sherman Act."
555 F.2d at 14-15. The dissent warns that the majority decision creates a new category of
antitrust suit which could have unforseeable effects upon state regulation. Id. at 15.
In Frankford Hospital v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d
1253 (3rd Cir. 1977), the court urged that the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is to
exempt the business of insurance from federal antitrust laws in favor of state regulation and,
therefore, the boycott exception must be interpreted with attention to the structure of the
entire Act. The court stated:
The Sherman Act proscribes practices which are monopolistic or are otherwise
unreasonable restraints of trade. The McCarran-Ferguson Act creates an exemption
from Sherman Act provisions, but at the same time allows for an exception to the
exemption. In this context, the terms boycott, coercion, and intimidation, cannot
be given as broad a meaning as they might have if used to define unreasonable
restraint of trade.
Id. at 1110. Failure to construe the boycott exception consistent with the purpose and struc-
ture of the Act would allow the exception to "all but swallow up the body of the McCarran-
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cording to this argument, the boycott exception would engulf the antitrust
exemption, rendering the McCarran-Ferguson Act meaningless.
In Barry, the First Circuit rejected this contention." The court reasoned
that state authority to regulate the business of insurance remains substan-
tially protected even if the terms "boycott, coercion and intimidation" are
given their ordinary meaning. 9 The court stated that within the field of
antitrust regulation, only the Sherman Act can pierce the exemption. 0
Antitrust liability is limited further by the fact that not every monopoliza-
tion or restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act involves boycott,
coercion or intimidation.71 Furthermore, the Barry court doubted that ap-
plication of the antitrust policies of the Sherman Act to dealings between
policyholders and insurance companies could threaten legitimate state
rate-fixing mechanisms that might be challenged as boycott, coercion or
intimidation. 2 Although nothing in the McCarran-Ferguson Act renders
the Sherman Act inapplicable to boycott activity, the state action exemp-
tion doctrine of Parker v. Brown 3 still protects state regulation from anti-
trust liability. 4 Perceiving adequate safeguards limiting application of fed-
Ferguson exemption." Id. The Third Circuit upheld summary judgment against hospitals
that challenged Blue Cross contracts which resulted in reimbursement of subscribers treated
at nonmember hospitals in amounts less than the charges for medical services. Frankford
Hospital argued unsuccessfully that the reimbursement differential diverted Blue Cross sub-
scribers away from hospitals with which Blue Cross did not contract amounting to a boycott
and coercion of those hospitals. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774, 780
(W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
555 F.2d at 8.
" Id.
7o Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of insurance from
the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970). See note 3
supra.
11 555 F.2d at 8. The court cited Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911),
and United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), presumably for the proposi-
tion that price fixing or monopoly practices that are harmless standing alone, and that involve
no boycott, coercion or intimidation, nonetheless violate the Sherman Act if they create
monopoly power or restrain trade. 555 F.2d at 8.
12 555 F.2d at 8.
- 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The term "state action exemption" is somewhat of a misnomer.
The Parker decision did not create an exemption; rather, it held that Congress never intended
to apply federal antitrust laws to the conduct of state government. Id. at 351.
11 In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld a state supervised agricultural prora-
tion program which restricted competition among California raisin growers. The Court found
nothing in the Sherman Act to suggest that Congress intended to restrain a state or its agents
from engaging in activities directed by the state legislature, even though such activities would
violate the Sherman Act if effectuated by private agreement or combination. 317 U.S. at 351.
The underlying thrust of the state action doctrine is that the antitrust laws are not intended
to reach state action, but are directed at private parties acting in concert. See generally
Handler, Twenty Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-18 (1972); Slater,
Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L.
REv. 71 (1974). The meaning of state action in the context of private entities acting pursuant
to state regulation is uncertain and difficult to apply.
The Supreme Court faced this question in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976). In Cantor, six justices concurred, stating that the practice of the defendant utility
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eral antitrust laws, the First Circuit concluded that a broad reading of the
boycott exception permitting policyholders to sue is consistent with the
structure and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption.
There is little reason to adhere to the narrow interpretation of the
boycott exception in view of the legislative history and plain meaning of
the statute. The Barry decision would appear to broaden the scope of the
boycott exception to encompass all acts and agreements involving boycott
contrary to the Sherman Act. In rejecting the "vitiation" argument,'5 how-
ever, the First Circuit did not satisfactorily establish that under an ex-
panded interpretation of the boycott exception, state rate-making func-
tions would remain protected from antitrust liability. If a boycott analysis
under the Sherman Act could characterize a rate-fixing agreement as a
partial boycott, 6 the boycott exception should not be given the broadest
possible interpretation because such an interpretation might expose insur-
ance companies engaged in state authorized rate-making activities to the
federal antitrust laws. Even though the McCarran-Ferguson Act manifests
a clear congressional intention to exempt rate-making from antitrust regu-
lation,77 the conduct of private companies who are members of a rating
bureau78 may be challenged as boycott, coercoin or intimidation and may
fall outside the state action antitrust exemption. 79 Thus, any judicial ex-
company of providing light bulbs free of charge to its customers could not be sheltered from
the purview of federal antitrust laws. Id. at 598. Even though the electric rates reflecting the
cost of light bulb distribution were approved by the state public service commission and could
not be altered without its consent, the Court refused to find the practice immune under the
state action exemption. Id. The impact of Cantor severely limits the exemption available to
private entities in state regulated industries. State authorization, approval, encouragement
or participation in restrictive activity does not appear to confer antitrust immunity. See id.
at 591 n.24. Only private conduct which is "compelled" by the state acting in its sovereign
capacity will be considered for protection as state action under Parker v. Brown. See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975). The Cantor decision does not clarify the extent
to which compelled conduct will be protected. Compare Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977) (although state bar opinion issuing
process was compelled by the state, state interest in the process was too tenuous to overcome
the process' anticompetitive effect on consumer interests) with Boddicker v. Arizona Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 416 U.S.L.W. 3215 (Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1636)
(analysis of compelled conduct in terms of whether the anticompetitive activity contributes
directly to improving service or to suppression of competition). See generally Dorman, State
Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 503
(1977); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 191 (1976);
Shenefield & Hartwell, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1975-76, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 7 (1977); Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 229 (1976).
7 See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
7' See AREEDA, supra note 50, at §§ 371, 380-81; note 65 supra.
In a concurring opinion in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), Justice
Blackmun cited the McCarran-Ferguson Act as an example of a legislatively created exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. Id. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
impact of Parker v. Brown on the legislative debates leading to passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 86-87 (E.D.N.C. 1965), aff'd,
361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
7 See note 16 supra.
"' See note 74 supra.
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pansion of the boycott exception must consider carefully the possibility of
increased interference with state regulation of insurance rates and prac-
tices.
Without directly considering the possible effect that an expanded read-
ing of the boycott exception might have on state authorized insurance
bureaus, the Proctor court refused to adopt the broad proposition sug-
gested in Barry8 that the boycott exception encompasses all acts of boy-
cott, coercion or intimidation and all agreements to boycott, coerce or
intimidate prohibited by the Sherman Act.8 The Proctor court distin-
guished between mere cooperation, concert of action or agreement and
enforcement activity amounting to boycott, coercion or intimidation.,
Under this analysis, rate-fixing activity among insurance companies,
whether done by private agreement or by a state authorized insurance
bureau, would not be actionable under the boycott exception unless ac-
companied by coercive enforcement activity. 3 In recognizing that the
terms "boycott, coercion and intimidation" could be read in such a way
to vitiate the antitrust exemption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,84 the
Proctor court attempted to exclude agreements85 among insurance compa-
nies to set primium and reimbursement rates from the scope of the excep-
tion. By applying the boycott exception in this manner, the Proctor court
asserted that it had achieved an accomodation between the purposes of the
antitrust exemption and the boycott exception, without relying on the
traditional, narrow construction.8
Although limitation of the boycott exception in this manner focuses on
coercive activities, the distinction made by the Proctor court between the
0 The Barry court held that the terms "boycott, coercion and intimidation" are unambi-
guous and, therefore, should not be narrowed artificially by resort to legislative history. 555
F.2d at 7-8, 12.
, 561 F.2d at 272.
" Id. at 275. In Proctor, the court held that a horizontal agreement among insurance
companies to pay automobile claims according to a common formula based on a fixed labor
rate did not, by itself, state a claim within the boycott exception. Id. at 274-75. Admittedly,
the insurance companies exerted economic pressure on non-cooperating repair shops by in-
forming policyholders which shops would accept reimbursement checks as payment in full.
Nevertheless, the court determined that as long as policyholders were free to use their reim-
bursement checks at non-preferred repair shops, there was no boycott, coercion or intimida-
tion within the meaning of the boycott exception. Id. Enforcement of the agreement by a
concerted refusal by the insurance companies to allow policyholders to patronize non-
preferred shops would, however, amount to a group boycott under § 3(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. Id. at 275.
" 561 F.2d at 274. The Proctor court noted that under this analysis the result in Meicler
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975), see note 36 supra, would remain
unchanged where the alleged boycott by insurance companies consisted of nothing more than
adherence to a premium rate setting and classification scheme. 561 F.2d at 275 n.21.
561 F.2d at 274.
For a comprehensive discussion on what constitutes agreement in antitrust law, see
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 655 (1962).
11 561 F.2d at 274.
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horizontal agreement to fix reimbursement rates and its enforcement dis-
solves in view of the statutory language of the boycott exception. Section
3(b) prohibits any act or agreement to boycott, coerce or intimidate." If a
rate-fixing agreement can be characterized as a collective refusal to deal
except at a fixed price,88 it is condemned by the language of the boycott
exception.
Courts should apply the rule of reason analysis to allegations of boycott,
coercion or intimidation rather than declare simple rate-fixing agreements
to be lawful as suggested by the Proctor court. In suits brought by policy-
holders and non-insurance businesses seeking relief under the Sherman
Act against insurance companies, courts should examine the economic
pressure exerted by any act or agreement that amounts to boycott, coercion
or intimidation to determine whether such conduct unreasonably restrains
trade.89 If an insurance practice challenged under section 3(b) has a signifi-
cant adverse impact on competition in the industry or business of the
plaintiff, it will fall to the rule of reason. 0
For three decades the boycott exception of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
has been given a restrictive construction unsupported by the plain mean-
ing of the language or the legislative history of the statute. Given the
current split of decisions in the circuit courts, however, there is a need to
refine the concept of boycott. Since the Supreme Court does not imply
antitrust exemptions lightly,"t expansion of the boycott exception beyond
the blacklisting concept to permit policyholders and non-insurance busi-
nesses to sue is in keeping with the general trend towards narrowing anti-
trust exemptions." Expansion of the boycott exception, however, must not
jeopardize the efficacy of state regulation under the banner of securing the
benefits of a free market economy for the consuming public. Application
of the rule of reason analysis to the boycott question will result in an
interpretation of the boycott exception consistent with the purpose and
structure of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
THOMAS P. HFALY, JR.
87 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970); see note 5 supra.
s See note 65 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at § 68.
" United States v. First City Nat'l . Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967).
92 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 9. Ultimately, the debate over
the proper scope of the boycott exception must involve an evaluation of the objectives of
federal antitrust policy. Although such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this work, there
appears to be a general trend towards narrowing or eliminating antitrust exemptions. See,
e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (limiting state action exemption);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (denying application of "learned profes-
sion" exemption to state bar association). In response to the consumer movement, Congress
has repealed the exemptions protecting agreements prescribing minimum prices for resale of
certain commodities. Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (repealed by Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)). For a recent discussion of the
goals of national antitrust policy, see Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium of the Eco-
nomic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977).
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